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ABSTRACT 
The concepts of  tlccisiori theory are discusscd,  espcciallg  in  the light of  their application to meteorology.  The 
use  of  thc priiiciplcs  of decision-making uiicler risk  rccluires  certatn  probability information to bc  available.  The 
issuancc of  forecasts it1 probability terms has a firm basis in theory and has bccti shown to work mcll it1 practice.  The 
txst verification statistic of  these forecasts is their usefulness to  the user aiicl this can be measured and compared with 
solile staticlard if  the utility matrix is known. 
A iiiulti-dimcnsioi~al  coiitingcricy table technique is used to cstimate the conditional probability clistribution  of 
the 5-hr. projection of  ceiling height at  Washington National Airport.  Three  predictors are scrcctied from 164 possible 
prcdictors according to the utility eriteiioti.  Dcvelopmeiital aticl tcst data results arc presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Meteorologists  have ever been concerned with making 
better forecasts.  There is  little  disagreeinent on what 
constitutes a good forecast; it is one that completely and 
accuriitely  describes the wenther  element being forecast. 
However, since  ti series  of  these  perfect foreciists is not 
attainable, it becomes necessary to have a measure of  the 
“goodness” of  a set of  forecasts in order to know when one 
group of  forecasts is really better than another.  There is 
anything but agreement nmong meteorologists as to what 
measure should be used to make this judgment, nnd  even 
as to how imperfect foreciists should be presented to the 
user.  Decision theory provides a framework within which 
forecasts can be eviduated nnd at the same time suggests 
the form in which forecasts should be issued. 
2.  USE  OF  DECISION  THEORY  IN METEOROLOGY 
CONCEPTS 
Decision theory was introdued in  1939  by Wald  [35] 
who published  the first book on the subject in 1950 [36]; 
in  it he formulnted statistics as  decision-making  under 
u ncer tninty. 
Consider  the problem  of  an individud who  needs  to 
decide upon a  course  of  action when several courses  of 
action tire available to him.  He knows, or can estimate, 
what his uttility (the numerical value of  his action) is for 
each possible action and for each possible stnte of  nature 
(future  happening)  relative  to  the  problem.  These 
utilities  can be arranged in the form of  a matrix and  as 
such comprise  a,  utility miLtris.  Conceptually, a utility 
matris is shown in table 1;  iu  this table Uz,  is the utility 
for action A, if  stnte of  nature I‘i  occurs. 
TABLE  1.-A  utility matrix.  Uii is the  utility for action Ai iJ  state 
of nature Yi  occurs 
I 
Action 
At  A?  ...  A* 
StaCc of 
Nature 
..  :  1:  .. 
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TABLE  2.-ConditionaZ  probability distribution of  states of  nature I‘i 
given the observations S, 
Obscrvations 
Nature 
x1  XZ  ...  XV 
TABLE  3.-All  possible  strategies  for the n possible  actions  and  p 
observations 
Obscrvations 
Xl  XZ  XV 
Strategy 
However,  the individual is uncertain  about  the state 
of  nature and must resort to past experience,  an experi- 
ment, or some other source of  information to obtain an 
estimate  of  the  probability  of  each  possible  state  of 
nature.  These probabilities may be a priori probabilities 
P[Y,];  or, if  he is fortunate, he can accumulate clatti that 
will allow him to construct a table of  conditional probabili- 
ties, called a  post~i~i  probabilities, of  Yt  given the ob- 
servations X,, P[1711Xj].  Such a table is shown in table 2. 
Alternatively,  the  conditional  probabilities  P[X,I YJ, 
along  with  the  a  priori  probabilities P[Yzj  will  suffice 
(and indeed P[  J’,lX,]  can  be  derived from P[X,,I  J’J  and 
P[YJ  by Bayes Theorem  [26])  and  the decision  problem 
is usually formulated in this manner.  Although the con- 
ditional probabilities are sliown here in tabular form,  which 
indicates a discrete distribution, continuous distributions 
are not ruled out and may be known for some problems. 
The individual now  needs to formulate a strategy  (a 
rule for decision making) which will indicate what action 
to  take  for  each  possible  observation  X,.  All  possible 
strategies can be arranged as shown in table 3. 
From the total of  k=np distinct strategies, the problem 
is  to find  the best one.  Suppose that the probabilities 
P[X,l P,]  are  available  and  let  U(S,,  Y,)  represent  the 
expected utility if  strategy S, is adopted and the state of 
nature Y, occurs.  Then 
... 
... 
... 
u(s,,  YJ =  a,p[,\i,  IKI  +  ul,p[x2  I YJ + . . . +  u,z[xPi  ~7,i 
(1) 
for i=1, 2, . . ., m. This gives a  total of  km  expected 
utilities, one for each possible  strategy and each possible 
state of  nature. 
If  O(,S,,Y,)  >  U(Sz,P,) for  all  i  and  the  inequality 
holds for at  least one due  of i,  S1  is said to dominate Sz. 
This means t(1iat no matter which state of  nature occurs 
the strategy SI  will yield on the average ns high or higher 
utililies than S2.  In this case Sz  is called an in~clmissible 
strntegy; all  strategies not dominated  by one  or  more 
other strategies are admissible. 
If  the a priori probabilities of  the states of  nature are 
available, the best strategy  (or  one  at least as good  as 
all the rest)  cnn be selected from  all admissible ones by 
computing the expected vnlue of  the utility U(S,)  for emh 
of  tlie strategies and choosing the one U(S,)  which is  at 
least as large as all tlie rest. 
~(8,)  = 5 wsj,  ~)~[17,1  (2) 
i= 1 
The strategies S, (of  which S,  is one) which are used in 
computing the expected utilities  U(S,) are ctdlecl  Bayes 
strategies and  it is  shown  by  Chernoff  and  Moses  [SI 
that (1) every  admissible-  st-rategy is  a  Bayes  strategy 
for  some  set  of  a  priori  probabilities  (P[Y,]>O  and 
P[P,]=1  7  (2) not all Bayes strategies corresponding 
to  the  probnbilities  P[j7,]>0  and  P[J7,1=1 may  be 
admissible but if  P[YJ are limited to greater than zero 
then  the corresponding Bayes Strategies are admissible, 
and  (3) a randomized Btiyes strategy (a strategy tliitt is 
a  random  mixture  of  two  or  more  pure  Bayes  strtite- 
gies) with the probability set P[TI’,]  niay dominate a pure 
Bayes strategy that was adniissible when only pure Bayes 
strategies were considered, but there is at least one pure 
Bayes strategy corresponding to that probitbility set that 
is  not  dominated  by  any randomized  Bayes  strategy. 
The result  of  these proofs is  that only pure admissible 
Bayes  strategies need  be  considered when  it is  desired 
to maximize the expected utility. 
Basically,  decision-making involving  states  of  nature 
falls  into  three  categories : (1)  decision-making  under 
certirinty, which occurs when the state of  iinture is known 
with  certainty,  (2)  decision-making  under  risk  wliich 
occurs when  the probability of occurrence of  each of  the 
states of  nature is known, and (3) decision-making under 
uncertainty when the probabilities of  the states of  nature 
are not known. 
m 
i=l 
1 
m 
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Criteria  other  than  thiit  of  Bayes exist  for  choosing 
the best strategy, but if  tlie problem falls into the category 
of  decision-making  under  risk  arid  if  the utility matrix 
contains  tlie  true  utilities  which  reflect  all  pertinent 
aspects of  the problem  and not just tlie money involved, 
the Bnyes solution is the only one tmliilt  need be considered 
[21].  Tf  the  problem  is  one  of  decision-making  under 
uncertainty,  an  unconditional  expected  utility  cannot 
be defined  [I]. 
In decision-making  under risk it is possible  to  select 
the best action for each observation X,  sep:triitely.  The 
selection can be done by computing 
(3) 
for each  action  A,, h=1,  2, . . ., n, and then selecting 
the  iLctioii  which  miiximizes  U(X,, A/(),  the  expected 
utility when observ:btioii X,  occurs and ilctiori A,  is taken. 
If  tliei-e  are  no observations X,, then lJIYzlX,]  can be 
repliiced by P[YZ]  to obtilin  ii constant course of  action. 
THE NEED 
~Vlienever  a weittlicr foreciist is niikde for a user it should 
be msutned that tlint user is going to indre an operationnl 
decision  based,  at least  in  part,  on  the  forecast.  Jt 
should be the responsibility of  thc forecaster to impart tis 
much  information  tis  possible  conceniiiig  tlie  weiltlier 
clemcnt or elements in which the user is interested.  If  it 
were possible  to predict ti  weather element perfectly,  110 
question would arise ils to how the informiitioli should be 
presented; a categorical Eorecnst would con tiiiii all of  tlie 
inforintrtion. 
Even if  the atmosphere is considered iLs  i~ deterministic 
system and the probability of  a  wenthcr event is either 
zero or one, not all of  the conditions which determine this 
future state are  laiowvn.  Undcr  these imperfect condi- 
tions there is a conditional probability distribution of  the 
weiitlier event wliicli contains all of  tlie information coii- 
ccriiing  the event furnished by the known initial condi- 
tions.  It  has  becn  shown  by  Scliroeder  [SO],  Sanders 
[28, 291,  and Root [27] that forecasters can  make rather 
good estimates of  these conditional  probabilities.  Jt  has 
dso been shown by Bricr [GI, Thompson [31], and Dickey 
[Ill, to mcntion  t~  few,  that objective forecasting  tecli- 
iiiyues tire useful for this purpose. 
1  here is increasing recognition among meteorologists of 
the  dcsirability  of  preseri ling  forecasts  in  probability 
terms.  The inaccuriicics  of  forecasts  have  long  been 
recognized,  as evidenced  by  the  use  of  such  terms  as 
“scixttered showers” nnd “occasional ceilings below 200ft.” 
However, these are vague terms and it is difficult even to 
pcrsuilde  the forecasters to attach probabilities  to t.hem, 
let alone to persuade the users to interprct tliern in this 
light. 
It  is many times mid, whenever :L  concurrent forecwst- 
vcrificiition  program is  being  conducted,  tliitt  the fore- 
casters are more conccrned with beating tlic verification 
r1 
system than with making good forecasts.  If  this state- 
ment is true, tlie verification system is iit fault and docs 
not mensure the “goodness”  of  the forccitsts.  How can 
the  “goodness”  of  fomciists  be  nieiisurcd?  This  is  a. 
question  that must be answered  by ct~c11  user  and the 
answer will  reflect  tliiit user’s  pwticulitr  utility matrix. 
Obviously, the user will want to malie tlic best decision 
possible  and  decision  theory  provides  :L  frttniework  in 
which  to work.  At tlic same time, the vcrification  stii- 
tistic for the set of  forec:ists is suggested. 
Although it is tlie user who must ultiin:Ltcly make tlie 
decision for his course of  action, the meteorologist usudly 
needs  to Concern  Iiiniself  with the decision  problem  for 
one or more reasons.  First, the user is 111i~liy  times not 
well versed in  the use of  the infornii~tion  which the mc- 
teorologist  can furnish liini and needs idvice dong these 
lines.  Sccond, the nicteorologist wiuits to furiiisli a set of 
unbiitsed conditiond probabilities  to the user.  The user 
mity not care what obsci-viitioiis went into the iLti:ilysis; lie 
is  willing  to  accept  tlie  meteorologist’s  word  tliat  the 
(conditional)  probabilities are correct.  However,  tlierc 
iirc usutilly many observiitioiis avitilibble to the nieteorolo- 
gist and it is his problem to choose the oncs to use in order 
tlii~t  his coriditiond probiLbilities fur~iisliecl  the user will be 
:LS  useful  its possible.  A Inrowledge of  the utility matrix 
will  help him decide wliicli observations to use.  Third, 
:ilthougti there is only oiie true set of  conditiond probubili- 
tics for a given set of observixtions, these population vltlues 
arc not known and must be estimntcd from ti data sample. 
This datn sample can be tt1iiilysed in Jllally wi~ys  and ~iot 
dl ttndyses will  yield  tlic smile  estimatc of  coiiditioiial 
probabilities.  A lmowledgc of  the utility matrix will hclp 
tlic meteorologist  to  decide  upon  a rncttiod  of  analysis. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Pioneering studies in  the use  of  decision  theory priii- 
ciples  applied  to  meteorological  problems  :ire  those  of 
Billinin  [3], Brier [5], Bijvoct and Blccker  [a], Thompson 
[31,  321,  and  Crossley  [9].  Thompson  :uid  Brier  [34j 
considered  a  2x2 cost  (or negative  monetary  utility) 
matrix which is comprised of  the cost, C of  one level  of 
protection and tlie loss L when  no protection is acconi- 
plished for each of  two possible weather ou tcoines adverse 
ctnd  good.  When tlie conditional probrLbility of  advcrsc 
wcntlier  is greater tlian  C/L  or less thiin  C/L, the action 
should be to protect or not protect rcspcctively.  They 
dso devised the score, “saving over climutology,” which 
is tlie aniount of  moncy that is saved, or lost, per dollar 
potential loss  wlicn  :L  scries  of  conditioiicil  probability 
forecasts is used over that siived when  tlic climatologicd 
expectancies (a  piiori probabilities)  are uscd.  This scoi’c, 
therefore, provides  a. meiisure of  the savings or usefulness 
of  a series  of  forecask and iit  tlie  sitme  time colllpiires 
it with a standard, climiitology. 
In recent years, several other studics lii~vc  been  mctdc 
in  wliicli the use of meteoi~ologicd  infoimihoii is ant~ly~cd 
within  tlie  framework of  decision  theory.  Borgmmi  [4] 
iindyxed an oil well drilling operation and observed that 386  MONTHLY  WEATHER  REVIEW  vol. 92, No. 9 
“Accuracy  [of  forecnsts] is desirdde but is not sufficieiit 
to guarantee utility.”  Nelson  and Winter  [25] consid- 
ered  the problems of  a truck dispatcher in  “tarping” or 
not “tarping” tlic loaded fleet overnight, of  a newspaper 
circulation  iiianngcr  in  deciding  whether  to  cover  tlie 
papers for outside delivery,  of the director of  a niotion- 
picture studio in  scheduling  outdoor  mid  indoor scenes, 
and of  a building contractor in sclreduling  worlmen for 
pouring  concrete.  Kolb  and Rapp  [18] and  Lave  [19] 
trented the impact of  weather  information  on  the  eco- 
nomics of  the rtiishi industry aiid ciitne to the conclusion 
that the use of  improved weather inform:ttion  by a single 
usel. could result in increased profits; however, the latter 
author states that if  the industry as  a whole  used  the 
improved inforination, “The inelasticity of  demand causes 
profit to fall  . . ., at least in the short run.”  For rainfdl 
forecasts made at Sm  Francisco, Root [27]  showed  tlint 
with a  C/L  of  0.10, forecasts made in  probability terms 
provided a liiglicr  siivitig  than did c1im:itology for both 
projections, 0-12  lir.  and 36-48  hr., but that the cate- 
gorical forecasts showed a higher s:iving  than climatology 
for only the shorter projection.  Denisetz [lo] concluded 
in  ii  study of  tropical storm protection measures of  the 
city of’  Miami  and electrical  service  restoration by tlie 
Florida Power C!  Light Company, that improved tracking 
of  tropical storms could be of subst:inti:il  vtilue but thiL(r 
tlie  economic  giiins  derivable froin existing  weather in- 
form:itioti  are probrhly not being  realized.  The latter 
point of  view has been generalized by Thompson [33]  who 
sliowed that for each of  three analyzed forecast problems 
the gain that can be realized by presentation of  the forc- 
casts in probability terms and the educated use of  theso 
forecasts is :I  substiiiitinl fr~ctiori  of  tlic gain that perfectr 
forecasts would allow,  except  for values of  C/L  near the 
iwbitrarily selected ctitegorical decision level. 
Gleeson  [Is] considered  the  multi-class  predictand 
problem in which  the upper aiid lower confidence limits 
of  tlie  relative frequencies  of  these  clnsses  are known. 
Gringorten [16, 171 iddressed the problem  of  estimating 
the conditional probabilities  in a manner that will  best 
beriefit  a particular user arid states, (‘111 theory, at  least, 
the issuing of  one probiibility  statement on a single day 
is not the most useful method to meet e\-ery operationill 
requirement.”  He  concluded  that  the  purpose  of’  the 
nnalysis  of  the  chta  should  be  to  minimize  errors  of 
estimate of  operational gains rather than errors of  estimate 
of  conditional probnbilities. 
3. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY  ESTIMATION 
AND PREDICTOR  SELECTION 
Conditional probabilities  can be estimated subjectively 
or objective techniques can  be  employed.  Some of  the 
techniques which use  historical  data and  estimate con- 
ditional probabilities by some variation of  the relative 
frequency  concept  :ire  scatter  diagrams  [B],  regression 
[24, 20, 23, 171, niid discriminant nndysis (221.  With the 
latter two of  these techniques predictors can be selected 
objectively from  2%  much larger set of  possible predictors 
according  to their  nbility  to give  good  probability esti- 
inrites; with scatter dingrams the selection  of  predictors 
is usually more subjective. 
~/lulti-dimensioii:il  contingency tnbles  [13] can be used 
for estimating conditionnl probabilities and with the use 
of  high-speed  conipiiters  predictor selection  accordiiig to 
some  desired  criterion  can  also  be  made.  Because  of 
scarcity of  data for some predictor category combinations, 
smoothing  over  neighboring  cells  of  the  contingency 
table is usuiilly necessary. 
4.  AN APPLICATION  TO  THE  5-HR. PROJECTION 
OF  CEILING  HEIGHT 
Conditional probnblilities  of  five  operationally signifi- 
cant classes of  cciliiig height (shown in table 4)  at Wnsh- 
ington  N:itioliiil  Airport  have been  estimated with  the 
use  of  multi-diniciisioiial  contitigency  tables.  Stepwisc 
predictor selection  from 164 possible predictors was maclc 
nccording to the utility criterion.  Ed1  possibIe predictor 
was  used  sepimdcly to  determine P[II’,(X,].  Then  tlie 
miixiiiiuni of  U(Xj,A,,), k1,  2,  . . . ,  7-~,  was found for 
each sample point nnd  this maximum summed over all 
sample points.  7‘11~ riiriable  that yielded  the  highest 
total expected utility was selected  ns tlie first predictor. 
‘Jlren  each  possible  predictor,  excluding  the  first  one 
chosen,  was used  with the first  to tigain  compute totiil 
utilities over the snmple.  The variable which together 
with the first produced the highest utility was choscn  as 
the  second  predictor.  This  procedure  TVRS  continucd 
until a total of  three predictors had been selected. 
At  each  21th  predictor  selection  a  p+1  dimensional 
hble was formed.  The (p  +  1)  th dinierision corresponcled 
to  the  predichnd.  Each  predictor  was  in  categorical 
form and for edi  stiinple point a count was  entered in 
t,he cell  of  tlie  table corresponding to the predictor  and 
predictand czitegorics.  Then for each predictor category 
combination the conclition a1 probability of  each predictmid 
category ivas  defined  by the relative frequency of  that 
predictand  ciiteg0t.y  to  the  total  observations  for  thiit 
particular pi’edictor combination. 
When inore tlinir one predictor was used,  the scarcity 
of observations for some predictor category combinations 
WiiS  a  problenr  aiid  sniootliing  over  surrounding  cells 
became  necessary.  Smoothing  rules,  based  partly  on 
intermediate results, were made as the study progressed. 
111  general, wlicii  the number of  observations hi a pnrti- 
cular predictor c:itcgory mas less than  IC, observations in 
surrounding cells were included in the conditional PrObiL- 
bility estimates.  The value of  k  used  for predictor se- 
lection  mas  10.  It w:~  also  necessary to specialize  the 
T LBLE 4.-The  Jive classes of  ceilzng height used as a predictund 
C.itcgory  Cciling  lleiglit (It)  -----___  - 
l......-......... 
2.-...............  200-  400 
J...---.-.  ... ...  500-  YO0 
4------.-.  .  .....  1000-2Y00 
5.................  23000 September 1964 
Predictor(s) 
__- 
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Actudl Utili1 y  1’-Score 
X=10  /;=.!5  h=10  /,=3 
__-______--_- 
smoothing to  each  type  of  predictor.  It, w;is  thought 
that the small gain in utility that could be cspected froni 
a  fourtli predictor  did not justify  the  computing time 
11ecess:tr.y to smooth a five-dirnciisioiinl  table. 
The coniplete list of  164 possiblc prcdictors is not included 
here.  Briefly, the predictors were meteorological 1-ariables 
obser\-ed hourly at the surface of  the earth at  Washington 
Niltional Airport aiid nine surroimdiiig stations, Atlantic 
City, N.J.,  Norfolk, Va., Willinnisport, Pa., Martinsburg, 
W. Va., Gordonsvillc, Va., Patusctit River, Md., Annapo- 
lis, Md., Roilnolie, Va., and Pittsburgh, Pa., and the time 
of  day and diL37  of  year of  the obscr\utioii.  The eleinents 
included  for  one  or  more  of  tlic  stations  were  ceiling 
height, visibility, west wind coiiipoiicnt, south wind coni- 
ponent,  temperature,  chv point, relative liumidity, sea 
level pressure,  amount of  cloud iii  lowest layer, amount 
of  cloud in the second layer, totd cloud :Lniount, opaque 
cloud  trmount,  type of  cloud  in  lowest  liiycr,  height  of 
lowest cloud layer, height of  second cloud lirSer, precipi- 
tiition,  fog,  stnbility of  air mass,  wind  speed, and wind 
direction.  (A complete description  of  the  164 possible 
prcdictors is found in reference [ 141 .) 
The developmental sample included  42SS  hourly ob- 
servatioiis taken during the 6-yr. period from January 1, 
1949,  through  Decenibcr  31,  1954.  It was  chosen  in 
such a way  that at least 5 hours elapsed  between  any 
two observations used  and the observations were evenly 
clistributcd as to time of  day. 
The utility matris shown in  table 5 and used in this 
study was devised by R. A. Allen after consultation with 
forecasters  at several  aviation  forecast  centers.  It  is 
thought tlliit  this matrix may not be far different  from 
that of  an actual utility matrix of  an airlitic  sild it was 
used by Enger, Recd, and MacMonegle [la, 131 for the 
purpose  of  dvaluating ceiling  height  forecasts  at seven 
terminals including Washington National Airport. 
The  thee predictors  selected  are shon-n  in  table  6 
together  with  the  expected  utility  and  1’-Score  [7] for 
each.  A  disudvautage  of  this  probability  estimation 
TABLE  5.-The  utdity nzatrix  zlsed  to  judge  the  iisefulness  of  the 
forecasts 
Forcc.isl  CJtegory 
Ohscr\ed Category I,  - 
\Vashington, ceiling ...._____..._...__._...~.. 
Washington, ceiling ._._..._.__.........______ 
Martinshurg, wind direction __.._.._......___ 
Martinshiirg, wind direction ...._........_.__ 
Washington, ceiling ... ..._.  .  _.  ._..._  ... .  ...._ 
Martinsburg, ceiling ... _.  _.  .  -.  _...._.  .  __ .._._ 
TABLE  6.-The  expected  utilities  and  P-Scores  .for  the  S  predictors 
selected  according  lo the utility criterion 
1450  1  1444 
1450  1 
Order 01 
Predictor 
Selection 
1450 
145i 
14.5i 
0.16C 
,166 
.  lti3 
1 ...__...._.... 
2 ._......___.__ 
3 .._._...._.___ 
\V:isliington,  ceiling .........  0.218  0.118 
Martinsburg,  wind  direc-  I 
%  1 
:?:  1  .?05 1  .211 
M:~rtinsburg,  cciling ...  ~ ....  793  ii6  ,197  ,205 
tion. 
0. 166 
,161 
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on test data by three predictors selected specifically for 
that purpose thnn by only the first predictor.  Also, the 
contingency table method becomes very cumbersome for 
more than thee  predictors and even if  very large samples 
were available for developmcnt, large amounts of  computer 
time  would  be  needed  for  probability determination. 
Other studies conducted  by the author, with  the same 
developmental and test data samples used in this study, 
indicate that some suitable parametric  technique,  such 
as multiple discriminant analysis, has more to offer for a 
prediction problem of  this kind than does this non-para- 
metric contingency t  ab1  e rn  ethod. 
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